

# editorial

## The Future of Differentiated Integration

Vivien Schmidt, Boston University and EU IDEA Advisory Board

After moving toward 'ever closer union' during its initial thirty years, the EU has for its subsequent thirty years been slowly differentiating even as it has continued to deepen integration via 'unity in diversity.' The EU response to the Covid-19 pandemic is likely to increase this trend. But this should not be a cause for alarm for those pro-Europeans worried that increasing differentiation through multiple speeds or multiplying opt-outs will lead to a union '*à la carte*,' with no *raison d'être* or identity. Nor should it be a cause for joy for those Euroskeptics hopeful that centrifugal forces will break it apart. The EU is here to stay as a differentially integrated supranational union of member-states, or what I have in the past called a 'region-state.'<sup>1</sup> As such, it might disappoint those hoping for a future 'hard core' Europe centered around the Eurozone. But it shouldn't, because the EU is already something much better, a 'soft' core Europe constituted by different clusters of member-states participating in overlapping policy communities, the majority of which participate in most if not all such policy communities.

But what does such a soft-core Europe entail with regard to membership in the EU's policy communities? And what of governance across policy communities, including the rules for EU institutions? Who votes and who has voice? These are key questions that need to be addressed, in particular in light of the EU's many crises, and especially the most recent.<sup>2</sup>

### The State of EU Differentiated Integration

The EU is already highly differentiated. While all member-states are part of the Single Market, membership in other policy areas is variable, including Schengen borders, Common Security and Defense Policy, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the Single Currency. Differentiated integration is also increased by the presence in the EU of 'outside insiders' like Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland that participate in the Single Market as well as in a range of other EU policy communities such as Schengen and Common Security and Defense Policy but don't have a vote. Beyond this are countries benefiting from EU 'neighborhood' policies involving deep and comprehensive free trade agreements, gradual integration into the EU economy, 'mobility and security pacts,' and the promotion of democracy and good governance, but without voice or vote in the EU. But even within the Single Market, while certain policy areas benefit from 'enhanced cooperation,' such as divorce, patents, and the to-be-deployed financial transaction tax, others remain without common rules, such as the differentiated tax regimes characterized by 'beggar thy neighbour' policy.

## The EU's Policy Crises

Although such differentiation has long existed, the challenges regarding it have become more acute as a result of the concatenating crises in key areas over the past decade, such as money (eurocrisis), borders (immigration and refugee crisis), security (terrorism and the neighborhood), the continuing integrity of the EU itself (Brexit), and now the health pandemic that has also triggered another economic crisis. With the exception of this last crisis, each previous was an object lesson in the problems of governance in the EU's differentiated policy communities.

Eurozone governance went too far in deepening integration in the wrong way, by 'governing by rules and ruling by numbers' (see my recent book with that subtitle)<sup>3</sup> while failing to institute the mutual risk-sharing instruments necessary for any fixed-currency zone to flourish. In other areas, integration did not go far enough. In security and defense policy, deeper integration is needed along with continued differentiation, with more co-operation and targeted investment through any of the many recently created instruments. Refugee and migrant policy also require deeper integration through EU-wide agreement on principles of treatment, accompanied by more differentiated integration regarding the modalities of implementation—for example with positive incentives in place of imposed quotas—and with a variety of refugee support and EU mobility adjustment funds.

The Covid-19 pandemic has surprisingly enough both intensified all of these policy challenges while pointing the way to possible solutions. The initial crisis response broke with past orthodoxies: in the Eurozone, by suspending the rules on debt and deficit; in competition policy, by relaxing state aid rules; in Schengen border controls, by imposing national border closings across Europe; and in migration and refugee policy, by ending migrant flows through border closures. But after an initial delay that appeared to be '*déjà vu all over again*' of the Eurozone crisis in terms of the lack of remedies,<sup>4</sup> the member-states took an unprecedented leap forward with regard to EU level initiatives. These initiatives deepened integration in a variety of ways. The Council, pushed by the Franco-German duo, created a European recovery fund based on grants that broke long-standing taboos by being paid for through EU level debt for the first time. The ECB targeted overall liquidity through its major pandemic emergency purchase program (PEPP) which went way beyond its previous quantitative easing. The Commission supported social rights via SURE, a short-term in-work job support program to reinforce member-states' own efforts in the area, established a new EU health agency, EU4Health, and upped the ante on the Franco-German proposal for a major new European recovery fund with the Next Generation EU Fund, financed through EU level bonds made up of the same level of grants while adding a third more loans, to go to member-states most affected by the crisis. Its focus on the green transition, the digital transformation, as well as social inequalities, promises to provide investment funding serving to reorient the European economy while jump-starting growth.

All of these new measures will serve to deepen European integration. But they do little to reduce the differentiation of the EU's many policy communities. Nor do they address the governance problems, in particular those linked to the unanimity rule. We need only consider the attempt of the 'Frugal Four' (Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, and Sweden) to torpedo the Recovery Fund, resulting in a less favorable balance of grants to loans in the Council's agreement, and the veto by the 'illiberal democracies' of Poland and Hungary of the final agreement between the Council and the EP, because of their opposition to its 'rule of law' clause.

### Governance in the EU as 'Soft Core' Europe

A soft-core EU is made up of the overlapping participation of different clusters of member-states in the EU's

many policy communities—all administered by a single set of EU institutions, all with voice across communities but with a vote only in those areas in which they participate. In this context, the decision-making rules would also require revision, with the unanimity rule abandoned in favor of ‘constitutional’ treaties amendable by two-thirds or four-fifths majorities, and treaty-based laws becoming ordinary legislation, amendable through the co-decision-mode of EU governance.<sup>5</sup>

Seeing the future of EU differentiated integration as consisting of a soft core of multiple clusters of member states, participating in overlapping policy communities, would allow for any duo or trio of member states to exercise leadership in any given ‘community’. But while some policy areas, as noted earlier, still require more coordinated integration, such as security and defense or immigration and refugee policy, others demand greater decentralization, such as the Eurozone. This may already be in the works, as the European Semester has shifted to overseeing the more bottom up process of member-states’ National Resilience and Recovery Plans (NRRPs).

Moreover, were some members to engage in deeper integration, such as pledging their own resources to a common eurozone budget or a security and defense fund, their representatives would be the only ones to vote, although everyone would exercise voice, on the assumption that many would ultimately join. In addition, where non-EU countries opt-in to certain policy communities, such as the Schengen border-free zone in the cases of Norway and Switzerland, they should have voice and vote in the interests of democratic legitimacy. This could equally apply to their participation in the single market. And the UK, too, would require vote and vote were it to rejoin some policy communities, for example, by reclaiming a leadership role in Common Security and Defense policy, while staying out of others, such as the Eurozone or Schengen borders.

But in the end, soft-core differentiation can only go so far. The EU also has certain common requirements—including one set of laws, overseen by the European Court of Justice and affirmed by national courts, and one set of overarching institutions, including the Commission, Council and Parliament. In other words, there can be no differentiation in the EU’s core commitments to the rule of law and democratic principles, guaranteeing free and fair elections, independence of the judiciary and freedom of the press. But in the rest, in the EU’s many policy communities beyond the Single Market, differentiation will enable the EU to go deeper faster, while respecting member-states’ differing readiness or willingness to join in, or not.

<sup>1</sup> Vivien A. Schmidt, *Democracy in Europe* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, Ch. 1. See also: Vivien A. Schmidt “Conceptualizing Change in Europe: Is Europe becoming a ‘Region-State’?” Chapter for *Conceptualizing Comparative Politics*, eds., Tony Spanakos and Francisco Panizza. London: Routledge, 2015

<sup>2</sup> For a fully developed version of the following argument, see: Vivien A. Schmidt, “The Future of Differentiated Integration: A ‘Soft-Core’ Multi-Clustered Europe of Overlapping Policy Communities,” *Comparative European Politics* vol. 17, no. 2 (2019): 294-315 <https://rdcu.be/br4oF>

<sup>3</sup> Vivien A. Schmidt, *Europe’s Crisis of Legitimacy: Governing by Rules and Ruling by Numbers in the Eurozone* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020 <https://global.oup.com/academic/product/europes-crisis-of-legitimacy-9780198797067?lang=en&cc=it>

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.socialeurope.eu/the-eu-responds-to-the-coronavirus-deja-vu-all-over-again>

<sup>5</sup> Schmidt, Vivien A. “The Future of Differentiated Integration: A ‘Soft-Core’ Multi-Clustered Europe of Overlapping Policy Communities,” *Comparative European Politics* vol. 17, no. 2 (2019): 294-315 [https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/springer-journals/the-future-of-differentiated-integration-a-soft-core-multi-clustered-zrGHVJC8QR?impressionId=5d054d32665f6&i\\_medium=docview&i\\_campaign=recommendations&i\\_source=recommendations](https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/springer-journals/the-future-of-differentiated-integration-a-soft-core-multi-clustered-zrGHVJC8QR?impressionId=5d054d32665f6&i_medium=docview&i_campaign=recommendations&i_source=recommendations) and Vivien A. Schmidt, “Europe’s ‘soft-core’ future of differentiated integration” *Social Europe* (Nov. 28, 2019) <https://www.socialeurope.eu/europes-soft-core-future-of-differentiated-integration>

# EU IDEA PUBLICATIONS

## RESEARCH PAPERS

### **Differentiated Integration and Accountability in the European Union – An Analytical Framework**

**Thu Nguyen**, Policy Fellow for EU Institutions and Democracy at the Jacques Delors Centre, November 2020

Differentiation has become an established feature of European integration in the past decades, and a variety of forms of differentiated governance have been established either within the EU Treaties, by the EU Treaties or outside the EU legal framework. At the same time, differentiated integration poses particular questions about how to organise accountability in an EU in which different groups of member states participate in very different forms of integration. Bringing together the accountability and differentiation literature, the paper develops an analytical framework allowing for an indicator-based assessment of accountability mechanisms. By proposing an analytical framework with concrete indicators for the assessment of accountability in various differentiated integration formats, this paper closes a gap in the literature and opens new paths for the comparative analysis of accountability across various shades of European integration.

## POLICY PAPERS

### **Differentiation from Below: Sub-national Authority Networks as a Form of Differentiated Cooperation**

**Pier Domenico Tortola**, Assistant Professor of European Politics and Society at the University of Groningen; **Stefan Coeperus**, Associate Professor of European Politics and Society at the University of Groningen, September 2020

Transnational networks of local authorities are an established and growing phenomenon in Europe, where they perform a number of (soft) governance functions for their membership, often in direct connection with EU institutions. This paper examines networks from the angle of institutional differentiation - an inherent trait of these organisations - in order to expand the analysis of this concept beyond its state-centric confines. The paper also adds to the study of (differentiated) integration more traditionally defined, both by analogy and insofar as networks are part and parcel of the Union's system of multi-level governance. Building on original empirical data, we identify three dimensions of differentiation generated by networks - insider-outsider, compound and multi-level differentiation - and discuss their implications for the efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy of networks' actions. Based on our analysis, we formulate three broad recommendations for policy-makers involved in networks: first, strive for inclusion, especially of smaller and less administratively capable sub-national governments; second, improve available information on networks in order to make their landscape more efficient; third, exploit the paradiplomatic advantages of networks both outside and inside the European Union.

### **External Differentiation in Access to the Single Market: Effectiveness, Accountability and Political Unity**

**Andreas Eisl**, Research Fellow on European Economic Policy at the Jacques Delors Institute, October 2020

This policy paper studies external economic differentiation - that is, the various forms of third-country access to the European Single Market. It analyses their accountability mechanisms

and evaluates their effectiveness - defined as the capacity to foster long-term economic integration and cooperation - as well as their potential effects on the EU's political unity. The paper identifies three key problems with existing external economic differentiation: overly static agreements, complex and fragmented institutional frameworks, and imbalances between rights and obligations in relation to the Single Market. Based on these findings, the policy paper highlights the importance of continuous market homogeneity for the effectiveness of external economic differentiation. Agreements that allow for the dynamic integration of the evolving EU acquis, that include mechanisms for its uniform interpretation and implementation and that are based on unified, simple and clear governance frameworks better achieve such homogeneity. In addition, agreements that are adaptable to evolving objectives and tailored to the size of individual third countries are more effective. The analysis of accountability mechanisms shows room for improvement in their deepening and extension to additional third countries. In terms of political unity, centrifugal forces can be contained through an adequate balance of rights and obligations in Single Market access.

## External Differentiation in Migration: Boosting or Hollowing Out the Common EU Policy?

**Asli Selin Okyay**, Senior Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI); **Sandra Lavenex**, Professor of European and International Politics at the University of Geneva; **Ivo Križić**, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Geneva, November 2020

The growing weight given to external cooperation leads to increasing participation by non-member states in EU migration and asylum policy, in both regulatory and organisational terms, constituting instances of external differentiation. This paper analyses the causes, shapes and effects of external differentiation. By examining the cases of Libya, Morocco, Turkey and Western Balkan countries, we demonstrate that the multiplicity of actors, venues and levels governing EU migration and asylum policy plays a significant role in driving and shaping external differentiation. We argue that the effects of external differentiated integration (DI) mechanisms on migratory pressure are relative and limited to the short run. Increasing intergovernmentalisation and informalisation of external differentiation has, however, significant repercussions on the EU's internal normative standards. We conclude that external DI mechanisms should be a complement to and not a substitute for comprehensive internal policies; and that external DI should go beyond a narrow focus on migration control and ensure full compliance with the EU system of rules regarding human rights, asylum and international cooperation.

## Differentiation in EU Foreign and Security Policy: EU Lead Groups in the Iranian Nuclear Dispute and the Ukraine Crisis

**Riccardo Alcaro**, Research Coordinator and Head of the Global Actors Programme of the Istituto Affari Internazionali and **Marco Sidi**, Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, December 2020.

Since the creation of the EU, there have been instances in which a restricted number of member states have handled an issue of international security on behalf of the Union. While controversial, these "lead groups" have been a valuable practice. They can enable a European response in the context of urgent conflict management and complex international negotiations. While they do not drive further EU integration, lead groups have been effective in generating intra-EU consensus on specific issues and spurring the EU into action. The paper assesses the conditions and performance of this foreign policy practice through an analysis of EU lead groups in the negotiations on Iran's nuclear programme and the Normandy mediation format between Ukraine and Russia. Lead groups are sub-optimal arrangements compensating for the in-built institutional shortcomings of unanimity-based decision-making in EU foreign policy. They have nonetheless shown significant potential in giving initiative and content to EU foreign policy, in that they either operationalise positions agreed at the EU level or create a policy where there had been none.

## Brexit, the “Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice” and Migration

Emmanuel Comte, Senior Research Fellow at the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB), December 2020

This policy brief focuses on EU–UK negotiations on the movements of third-country nationals. It presents the formation of preferences of both sides and creates a map of existing external differentiation in this area, which supplies models for the future EU-UK relationship. Current negotiating positions show the continuation of previous trends and the potential for close cooperation. This policy brief details two scenarios of cooperation. Close cooperation would continue the current willingness to cooperate and minimise policy changes after the transition period. Loose cooperation could stem from the collapse of trade talks, breaking confidence between the two sides and resulting in a suboptimal scenario for each of them. No scenario, however, is likely to result in significantly lower effectiveness or cohesion in the EU. The UK will always be worse off in comparison to EU membership - particularly under loose cooperation.

### EU IDEA SPECIAL INITIATIVE



Last March EU IDEA launched the “**Framing Brexit: EU IDEA visual and video award**”, aimed at giving the opportunity to young people to express through visual artworks how they are experiencing and interpreting the exit of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU).

After decades of increasing integration among European countries, this is the first time that a country has opted to leave the EU. People between 18 and 30 years old were invited to illustrate through artistic creations what Brexit means for them. After viewing the various works received, our dedicated jury has identified Madeleine Kay and the team composed by Megan Daniels and Ola Medzinska as the two winners. The winners will be awarded and their artworks presented publicly during the final conference of the project in Brussels in December 2021.

Take a look to these precious contributions and find out how young people are experiencing Brexit.

# EU IDEA MULTIMEDIA

## PODCAST



**Work package 6: The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), including migration**, a discussion with **Emmanuel Comte**, Senior Research Fellow at Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB), and **Asli Okyay**, Senior Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).

## VIDEOS



**The EU-UK relationship**, a brief policy debate with **Nicoletta Pirozzi** (IAI and EU IDEA Project Coordinator) **Fabian Zuleeg** (EPC Chief Executive) and **Kati Piri** (MEP and co-rapporteur on the future EU/UK partnership). In this video we discuss the main issues addressed at the public event organized in Brussels by EPC in the framework of the Horizon 2020 project.



**Schengen under pressure**, based on the Policy paper by **Marie De Somer**, Head of the Migration & Diversity Programme at the European Policy Centre (EPC) and Visiting Professor at KU Leuven and Sciences Po.; **Funda Tekin**, Director of the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP); **Vittoria Meissner**, Senior Researcher at IEP.

Concept and production by Eunews.

## EU IDEA EVENT

### The future of the EU-UK relationship | ON-LINE POLICY DIALOGUE

Thursday 3 December 2020

On 3 December 2020 the European Policy Centre hosted a public event 'The future of the EU-UK relationship' as part of a one-and-a-half-day virtual activity in the context of the EU-IDEA project. The discussion revolved around the current state of play of the Brexit negotiations and the prospects for the future relationship. Nicoletta Pirozzi introduced the event with an overview of the EU IDEA project before handing over to Jannike Wachowiak who moderated the panel. Panelists included Stefaan de Rynck (Head of Unit of the Task Force for Relations with the United Kingdom at the European Commission), Kati Piri (Member of the European Parliament and Member of the UK Coordination Group), Sir Ivan Rogers (Former Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the European Union), and Fabian Zuleeg (Chief Executive of the European Policy Centre).

Discover the main insights of the discussion in the dedicated report.

The event was held by the European Policy Centre in the framework of our Observatory on Brexit.

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## FROM THE NETWORK

### | Publications

**Recommendations - Portuguese Presidency**, TEPSA Network, compiled by Nicoletta Pirozzi, Istituto Affari Internazionali; Funda Tekin, Institut für Europäische Politik; Ilke Toygür, Real Instituto Elcano, November 2020. Contributions:

- *The Portuguese Presidency: Striking the balance between finishing unfinished business and setting its own mark*, by Nicoletta Pirozzi, Funda Tekin and Ilke Toygür;
- *The New Pact on Migration and Asylum*, by Anna Krasteva and Andrea Membretti;
- *Vasco da Gama'ing into the future: Taking a next European digital step*, by Piret Kuusik;
- *Partners or just neighbours? Toward a decisive year for EU-Africa relations*, by Bernardo Venturi;
- *Mercosur: the cost of a no agreement*, by Carlos Malamud.

**European migration and border management: Future reforms reassert symbolic solidarity**, by Saila Heinikoski, Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), November 2020.

**EU strategic autonomy: A reality check for Europe's global agenda**, by Niklas Helwig, Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), October 2020.

**EU peace mediation in the 2020s: From intervention to investment**, by Tyyne Karjalainen, Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), 14 October 2020.

**The deepening Finnish-Swedish security and defence relationship: From operative cooperation to 'strategic interoperability'?**, by Matti Pesu and Tuomas Iso-Markku, Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), October 2020.

**The future of the Transatlantic Alliance: not without the European Union**, by Sven Biscop, Egmont - Royal Institute for International Relations and Ghent University, September 2020.

## Video



### German - Italian strategic forum on Europe

On the sidelines of the German-Italian Forum on Europe, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) wanted to concentrate a series of reflections on European current events in a video. From the program adopted during the German presidency of the EU Council, to the economic challenges that the European Union must face due to the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, passing through the promotion of multilateral dialogue between Italy and Germany. These are the main topics covered in the video, with interventions by: Gabriele Bischoff, Member of the European Parliament; Brando Benifei, member of the European Parliament; Nicoletta Pirozzi, Institute of International Affairs (IAI); Luca Argenta, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES); Paweł Tokarski, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP).

## Podcast



### Bonus Episode of Constitutionally Sound - Brexit deal or no deal?

with Professor Michael Keating (University of Aberdeen) and Elvire Fabry (Jacques Delors Institute), December 2020

The transition period for negotiating a future relationship between the UK and EU will end on 31 December - what will be the consequences if a deal cannot be reached in the next few weeks? In this bonus Brexit episode of Constitutionally Sound, our host, Allan Little gets the views from both sides of the talks from Professor Michael Keating (University of Aberdeen) and Elvire Fabry (Institut Jacques Delors). Our experts provide an overview of the fundamentally different approaches and stances the two sides are taking in relation to the negotiations, and what will be most difficult for them to solve. They also explain the possible consequences talks will have on trade, politics, and the UK Union. In closing, Michael and Elvire give their outlooks for a deal.

## | Past events

### **The External Dimension of the European Green Deal – Prospects for Cooperation with (Re)Emerging Powers**

Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), 16-17 November 2020

Based on brief input papers, the workshop discussed with participants from Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and Russia about:

- Understandings of key requirements necessary for “green leadership” globally;
- Partners’ perspectives on “greening” (including plans for re-building after the COVID-19 pandemic and what is known/planned already);
- Where are potential joint interests or disagreements with regard to partner countries and the EU’s Green Deal? Which role should the EU have?

The event was a preparatory workshop aspiring to feed into a conference in 2021. It was organised by the ‘Managing Global Governance’ (MGG) programme of the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) in cooperation with the Finnish Institute for International Affairs (FIIA) and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS).

### **Debating the Future of Europe: Towards meaningful EU criticism**

Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), 10 November 2020

This event marked the publication of the book *Euroscepticism and the Future of Europe: Views from the Capitals* edited by Michael Kaeding, Johannes Pollak and Paul Schmidt.

The webinar was organised in cooperation with the European Parliament and the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA). Co-funded by the Europe for Citizens Programme of the European Union.

### **Opening Discussion Of the 12th German-Nordic-Baltic Forum 2020**

Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), 27-28 November and 2nd December 2020

Within the framework of the German-Nordic-Baltic Forum (GNBF), the event discussed current European topics that are of relevance for the German-Nordic-Baltic region particularly in view of internal and external challenges in the shadow of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The digital Forum was kicked off by two public keynotes from the Finnish Minister for European Affairs and Ownership Steering, Tytti Tuppurainen, Prime Minister’s Office and the German Minister of State for Europe at the Federal Foreign Office, Michael Roth, followed by three commentaries from young researchers and students.

The webinar was organized in cooperation with the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP).

### **Italian-Dutch Round-Table Van Wittel / Vanvitelli**

Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), 14 December 2020

On December 14, 2020, the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and the Clingendael Institute in cooperation with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the support of Fondazione Compagnia di San Paolo will organize the second Online edition of the Italian-Dutch Round-Table Van Wittel / Vanvitelli. The event, which will be opened by the Italian and Dutch Ministers of Foreign Affairs, will gather experts from institutions, universities, NGOs and think tanks, coming from both countries. The aim is to discuss about green economy, the Next Generation Europe Plan, migration and labour markets’ integration and to identify possible new synergies both at the bilateral and multilateral levels.

## THE CONSORTIUM



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This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 822622

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