

Based on the paper **Differentiation in EU Foreign and Security Policy: EU Lead Groups in the Iranian Nuclear Dispute and the Ukraine Crisis**,
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**LEAD GROUPS: SMALL GROUPS OF MEMBER STATES
THAT HANDLE ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
ON BEHALF OF THE UNION.**

When

How

Other Member States find it **more advantageous to support**
rather than oppose their leadership.

The group insiders get recognition from third players,
presenting the other member states with a ***fait accompli***
that is hard to contest (or to reverse).

Lead groups may work as a disincentive for EU member
states to seek greater foreign policy integration.

On the other hand, lead groups surely contribute
to making EU foreign policy **more pro-active**.

The consent comes ex post.
Then, a lead group can only endure if it carries out a policy
that reflects **EU-wide normative and strategic interests**.

For example

The E3 (Germany, France and the UK) working on **Iran's
nuclear issue** and the Franco-German Normandy duo
brokering **peace between Ukraine and Russia**.

Conclusions

AS THEY OPERATIONALISE POLICY POSITIONS AGREED AT THE EU LEVEL,
OR CREATE A POLICY WHERE THERE WAS NONE,
LEAD GROUPS ARE A **POSITIVE NET** FOR EU FOREIGN POLICY.

